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Abstract 
There was a time before WIRS when what we knew of industrial relations was based 
primarily upon small scale surveys and case studies.  WIRS marked a radical departure in 
the study of industrial relations for two reasons.  First, following in the footsteps of a 
small number of survey forerunners, it sought to ‘map’ industrial relations in Britain with 
nationally-representative large-scale surveys of workplace managers, thus permitting 
investigation of the incidence of practices and changes over time.  Second, it focused on 
industrial relations institutions and outcomes, linking them to the processes of industrial 
relations that had been the chief focus of studies up until that point.  This paper reflects 
on some of what we have learned in the five surveys over the quarter century since 1980, 
focusing selectively on the demise of collective IR and the coming of human resource 
management (HRM), pay determination and the union wage effects, variable pay, the 
climate of employment relations and union effects on employment growth. 
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1.  In the beginning…. 
The first attempt to identify the contours of industrial relations (IR) with large-scale 
nationally-representative surveys of workplaces in Britain was made by the Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations – the Donovan Commission 
- in 1966 (Government Social Survey, 1968).  Others followed, notably follow ups to the 
Donovan Commission’s surveys in 1972 and 1973 (Parker, 1974; Parker, 1975), Daniel’s 
(1976) PEP survey of workplace wage determination and the Warwick Workplace 
Survey of 1977-8 (Brown, 1981).  But large-scale surveys of IR were uncommon in 
Britain in the 1960s and 1970s.  The empirical basis for the discipline consisted largely of 
case studies and small scale surveys. 
This changed with the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1980 (WIRS80).  In the 
forword to the WIRS84 sourcebook Peter Brannen, one of the originators of the WIRS 
series, explained how WIRS was first conceived: 
“The first systematic survey of employment relations issues was undertaken for the 
Donovan Commission.  Two other national surveys followed shortly afterwards.  But 
these surveys never became part of a systematic series.  The idea of establishing a series 
of Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys was developed in the late 1970s in the 
Department of Employment to remedy this lack of systematic data and to make possible 
the analysis of change and continuity over time” (Millward and Stevens, 1986: x). 
All national, employer-based surveys have some aims in common.  As Millward, 
Marginson and Callus (1998: 137) point out, they provide a ‘snapshot of the structures, 
practices and outcomes of industrial relations’; identify diversity and heterogeneity 
within employer populations; offer opportunities for hypothesis testing and theory 
building; provide data for policy evaluation; and, if repeated over time, can map change 
and identify reasons for it.  Their methodological strength is in offering generalizability 
and transparency (op. cit.; Marginson, 1998). WIRS80 was no different in these respects. 
What did make it different was its co-sponsorship by government (Department of 
Employment), the academic community (the Social Science Research Council, the 
forerunner to the Economic and Social Research Council) and the Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI).1  The Department’s interest was ‘to ensure that there was established a solid base 
for analysis of industrial relations practice and procedures as a background for policy 
making’ (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 2).  SSRC’s aim was ‘to ensure that a rich, new 
data base about industrial relations was made available to the whole community of 
researchers and scholars in a form that was most useful to them’ (op. cit.).  PSI was 
concerned ‘that the information be used for medium term policy analysis and evaluation’ 
(op. cit.).  These differences were accommodated in a spirit of collaboration and 
cooperation which “at least in the judgment of those most closely involved…represents a 
new and valuable arrangement for carrying out research relevant to public policy and 
scholarly enquiry” (op.cit.). 
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 From 1984 the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) has been the fourth co-sponsor of 
WERS.  
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For Marginson (1998: 362) the commonalities in purpose – ‘to provide a detailed account 
of workplace industrial relations that was nationally representative’ – and design ‘mark 
out the workplace survey undertaken for the Royal Commission as the forerunner of the 
WIRS series’.  But it was Daniel (1976) that was the immediate forerunner to WIRS80 
and is perhaps the survey that most heavily influenced WIRS in its design and execution.  
Describing with enthusiasm the PEP 1976 survey, Daniel says: 
“This is the first time that the sample survey method, based on personal interviews with 
management and union representatives, has been used…to contribute towards an 
understanding and explanation of the process of labour relations, rather than simply 
describing its institutions” (Daniel, 1976: 1). 
The PEP survey was indeed path-breaking in using nationally-representative data to look 
at ‘ways in which pay and pay increases are determined at work’ (op.cit.).  At the time it 
was perfectly reasonable to focus on the manufacturing sector because this was ‘the 
largest sector in the British economy’ (p. 2).  It was also natural for the survey to 
concentrate on pay determination through collective bargaining, since this was the 
dominant form of pay setting in manufacturing. The chief concern at the time was the 
desire to map both ‘formal’ workplace-level bargaining plus ‘the more informal shop 
floor bargaining over rates for the job under payments for results and other types of 
special or premium payment, at a lower level, and the company and industry bargaining 
at a higher level’ (p.2).  In other words, Daniel was keen to reflect the complexity of 
collective bargaining over pay, a system that had been carefully depicted by the Donovan 
Commission in the late 1960s.  This focus on manufacturing and on collective bargaining 
led inexorably to a focus on plant-level analysis because ‘this is generally the most 
important level of formal bargaining for manufacturing’ (p.2).  Thus this survey was an 
important influence on the development of WIRS in terms of the primary unit of analysis 
(the workplace) and, at least in the early years, the concentration on collective bargaining.  
The survey’s limitations also influenced thinking on WIRS, especially Daniel’s remarks 
that the small sample size was ‘frustrating’ and ‘exasperating’, amply illustrated with 
examples he presents on the first page of the report.  
Now that the WIRS survey has been carried out five times with reasonable success it is 
easy to understate the ambition and potential risks associated with the first survey in 
1980. As Cully (1998) reminds us, OPCS senior statisticians had advised against 
WIRS80 saying that ‘a survey which takes establishments as its unit of analysis will not 
succeed in its research aims….[due] to the unreliability of information obtained from 
individuals acting as proxy informants’2  Furthermore, it was a far more ambitious 
enterprise than any workplace survey undertaken hitherto.  The three earlier surveys had 
been confined to manufacturing workplaces and had focused on large establishments the 
size thresholds being 50, 150 and 200 employees in the case of the Warwick, Donovan 
survey and PEP Surveys respectively.   WIRS80, in contrast, covered the whole economy 
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(manufacturing, private services and the public sector) and lowered the employment 
threshold to workplaces with 25 or more employees.3  
The resultant WIRS80 survey was also challenging from an analysts’ perspective.  The 
computer technology we take for granted today when crunching surveys was only just 
emerging at the time, with analysts relying on slow mainframes to process data held on 
magnetic tapes.  The other challenge was one of interpretation and understanding, 
especially in relation to private services and the public sector where there was little or no 
large-scale data with which to compare the results. 
IR was very different a quarter of a century ago, as we all know, but perhaps we forget 
just how different.  As Daniel and Millward (1983: 1) note in their opening paragraph, IR 
had ‘been at the forefront of public and political debate in Britain’ for the previous two 
decades and ‘reform of the industrial relations system had been part of every political 
party’s manifesto’.  This is because IR was viewed as a serious problem, its turbulence 
contributing to macro-economic problems and difficulties for firms, workers and their 
families.  This impact is amply illustrated by Daniel’s reflections on the effect that 
turbulent IR had on PEP’s ability to conduct its workplace manufacturing survey in 1976.  
“We had wanted in our study to look at plant negotiations under the normal process of 
collective bargaining” says Daniel plaintively, recalling just how difficult this had been 
due to Conservative incomes policy, the three day week, ‘then a period of sorting out the 
aftermath of both of these’, followed by the new £6.00 pay limit policy (Daniel, 1976: 2-
3).  If anything, things deteriorated in the period prior to WIRS80, culminating in the 
Winter of Discontent in 1979, the year in which union density and union membership 
peaked in Britain.  No wonder, then, that 14% (42 pages) of Daniel and Millward (1983) 
was devoted to ‘Trade Union Recognition and Associated Issues’, 7% (21) to ‘The 
Closed Shop’, 7% (22 pages) to ‘Trade Union Organisation’, 12% (36 pages) to ‘Pay 
Determination’, and 13% (39 pages) to ‘Industrial Action’. 
If we fast forward some 25 years, there are two obvious points to make about WIRS 
today.  First, there is a general acceptance of the value of large-scale survey data 
collection in furthering our understanding of IR.  It is not without its critics, of course 
(McCarthy, 1994; Blackburn, 2005).  Although there is general consensus that large-scale 
surveys are complements to case-study and other methodologies in investigating IR, there 
may be some justification for the view that large-scale data collection and analysis are 
‘crowding out’ case-study investigation of IR to the detriment of the discipline 
(Marginson, 1998).  It is evident, however, that even in area of large-scale surveys WIRS 
is no longer the only game in town.  The Warwick Company Level Industrial Relations 
Surveys (CLIRS) have provided what Marginson (1998: 364) refers to as ‘a 
complementary comprehensive portrait of industrial relations structures, practices and 
policy formation beyond the workplace among large enterprises across the trading sector 
of the economy’; and there has been an explosion in government evaluation surveys, 
many of which are workplace-based. 
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 This coverage was made possible by a better sampling frame, the Census of Employment (Daniel and 
Millward, 1983: 5-6). 
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Second, there has been a seismic shift in the discipline reflecting changes in IR structures 
and practice, embodied in the change in the survey’s name from WIRS to WERS.  In 
essence these changes are two-fold.  The first is the movement away from joint regulation 
to the restoration of managerial prerogative and the re-emergence of the ‘managerialist’ 
HRM agenda.  The second shift has been towards much greater interest in employees’ 
experience of work in its own right.  WIRS has reflected these trends with a very 
substantial shift in the nature of the survey instruments and survey design (Cully and 
Marginson, 1995; Cully, 1998; Marginson, 1998; Marginson and Wood, 2000; Kersley et 
al., 2006).  The ever-changing nature of WIRS reflects an abiding concern with 
continuity and change.  Identifying the degree of continuity in IR means retaining a core 
set of questions which permit the construction of time-series data.  Identifying the nature 
and reasons for change entails innovation in survey questioning and design.  This was 
apparent to the inventors of WIRS at the outset.  Introducing the WIRS84 book, Peter 
Brannen says that it “provides a comprehensive overview and descriptive analysis of the 
survey data and sets out in a lucid and objective manner a wealth of material on 
employment and industrial relations in British workplaces…More importantly, however, 
the authors have been able to identify, in a rigorous manner, changes and developments 
over the previous years.  This is the first time that such systematic monitoring has been 
possible’ (Millward and Stevens, 1986: xi, my italics).  Brannen explains that, in order to 
achieve this, ‘a substantial core of common questions was retained but a new topic area, 
concerned with technical change, was introduced…In addition an experimental panel 
element was built into the design.’ And so the state of permanent revolution which is the 
WIRS series got underway.  Recently this ‘revolution’ has included a new employee 
survey linked to workplaces introduced in 1998 and extended in 2004, the refinement and 
extension of the panel survey, the linkage of the survey data to financial information in 
the Annual Business Inquiry (Kersley et al., 2006), the interviewing of non-union worker 
representatives in 2004, and a reduction in the employment size threshold for inclusion in 
the survey from 25 employees to 10 in 1998 and 5 in 2004 (Forth et al., 2006). 
In the remainder of this paper i focus on WIRS’ treatment of the following substantive 
themes in IR: 
- the demise of collective IR 
- the coming of HRM 
- pay determination and union wage effects 
- variable pay 
- the climate of employment relations 
- and union effects on employment growth. 
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In doing so, i draw on the primary sourcebooks and some of the seminal secondary 
analyses that appeared in academic journals.  My intention is to reflect on how WIRS 
marked such an important departure in the study of IR. 
2.  The Demise of Collective Industrial Relations                                                                                                                                                 
Reflecting on changes in industrial relations traced with the first four WIRS surveys 
(1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998) Millward et al. (2000: 234) proclaimed the end of collective 
industrial relations in Britain: 
“The Conservative government that came to power in 1979 confronted a system of 
collective employment relations that was dominant, though not universal…That system 
of collective relations, based on the shared values of the legitimacy of representation by 
independent trade unions and of joint regulation, crumbled in the intervening eighteen 
years to such an extent that it no longer represents a dominant model”. 
They maintained that this change was so profound that it ‘can reasonably be regarded as a 
transformation’ (op. cit.).  Union membership and density had peaked in 1979 
(Charlwood and Metcalf, 2005).  Comparisons of WIRS80 with earlier IR surveys had 
indicated a ‘growth in the formality of workplace industrial relations’ (Daniel and 
Millward, 1983: 296) as advocated by the Donovan Commission.  Despite Thatcher’s 
first term in office, WIRS measures of collective IR were fairly stable between 1980 and 
1984 (Millward and Stevens, 1986: 302-305) with workplace union recognition actually 
rising in the economy as a whole (Millward and Stevens: 1986: 62-63).  Yet even in 1984 
there were signs of change with decline in the closed shop and in union presence (any 
members on-site) and a fall in union recognition in manufacturing (Millward and 
Stevens, 1986).  This took commentators at the time by surprise.4  But it was only when 
comparing WIRS84 with WIRS90 that analysts became aware of just how much had 
changed over a very short period.  The authors argued ‘so great were the changes that it is 
not unreasonable to conclude that the traditional, distinctive “system” of British industrial 
relations no longer characterized the economy as a whole’ (Millward et al., 1992: 350).  
Purcell (1993) called it ‘the end of institutional industrial relations’.   
For many years it had been possible to track changes in union membership with data 
lodged with the Certification Officer by trade unions.  One-off surveys of individuals 
such as the National Training Survey 1975 also contained union membership, but it was 
only later that repeat cross-section surveys of individuals permitted analyses of changes 
in union membership.  British Social Attitudes (BSA) was among the first, collecting 
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 For example, Willie Brown, writing just before the release of Millward and Stevens (1986) had said: 
“Although, for the British economy as a whole, the level of unionisation has fallen substantially during the 
recession, from 55 per cent in 1979 to around 45 per cent now (the level at which it remained throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s), it is hard to see it fall much further, so well entrenched is the practice of 
collective bargaining and, with it, closed shop and check-off arrangements” (Brown, 1986: 167). 
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union membership data from 1983.5  WIRS’ unique contribution was two-fold.  First it 
tracked change in workplace-level institutions, notably union recognition, the pre- and 
post-entry closed shop, bargaining structures (multiple versus single-unionism and, where 
multiple unions existed, the use of joint versus separate bargaining arrangements), the 
presence of on- and off-site worker representatives, workplace union density and 
collective bargaining coverage and the scope of collective bargaining.  Most of these 
items were present from the outset.  They have been added to subsequently with 
measures such as occupation-level collective bargaining coverage within workplaces, 
occupation-level union membership presence, employer perceptions of unions’ roles and, 
with the advent of linked data from employees, individual worker union membership. 
The second unique contribution was its ability to identify union effects on outcomes such 
as wages, productivity, climate, employment growth and financial performance.  (I 
discuss union effects on wages and employment growth later). 
Collective IR in Britain rested on employers’ voluntary recognition of unions for pay 
bargaining.6  Since this decision was usually made at workplace or organization-level it 
made sense to talk of union recognition as a workplace attribute.  Yet this concept of 
workplace-level union recognition only really entered the IR lexicon with WIRS.  The 
difficulty with reliance on coverage by a collective bargaining agreement was that since 
most were, at the time, multi-employer agreements, it was unclear how they related to 
workplace-level industrial relations.  Studies had indicated nominal coverage in many 
cases and managerial difficulties in accurately identifying whether their workplace was 
covered or not.   
Certainly in those early days of WIRS union recognition was a good indicator of union 
activity on the ground at the workplace, but it was by no means the only important 
measure.  The IR literature had shown how differently unions operated in the presence of 
an on-site lay official, and according to whether or not that representative was full-time 
or part-time (McCarthy, 1967).  Labour economists were keen to exploit information 
indicating the degree of strength unions had when restricting the supply of labour to 
employers.  This bargaining strength was often proxied by WIRS indicators of union 
density, multi-unionism and the presence of pre- and post-entry closed shops. 
In recent years union recognition for pay bargaining has become a less reliable indicator 
of union activity at workplace-level due to the ‘hollowing out’ of unionization even 
where a union is present.  This first became apparent with WERS98 when sourcebook 
analysts uncovered a high percentage of workplaces with union recognition where there 
appeared to be no collective bargaining coverage (Millward et al., 2000: 159-167).  This 
‘hollow shell’ phenomenon, also uncovered in case study work by Brown et al. (1998), 
was apparent once again in WERS04, extending to all aspects of joint regulation, not just 
pay determination (Kersley et al., 2006: 193-6).  It is also apparent in the precipitous 
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 Other early studies containing union membership information include the General Household Survey, the 
National Child Development Survey and the British General Election Survey.  The Labour Force Survey 
collected membership data from 1989. BHPS has collected it since it began in 1992. 
6
 This remains the case in spite of the statutory recognition procedure introduced by the Employment 
Relations Act 1999. 
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decline of union membership within unionized workplaces.  The rate of union density 
decline within recognized workplaces rose three-fold in the 1990s compared to the 
second half of the 1980s (Millward et al., 2000: 139-145) resulting in substantial growth 
in free-riding (Bryson and Freeman, 2006a). 
IR analysts and commentators became so used to union decline in the 1980s and 1990s 
that they had come to expect it.  This decline took two forms: a reduction in the incidence 
of unionization in the workplace population and, where it continued to exist, a diminution 
in its reach and strength.  From the mid-1980s there was a precipitous decline in union 
recognition, the closed shop, and workplace multi-unionism (Millward et al., 2000).  The 
decline in union recognition continued into the 1990s, albeit at a slower rate, but this 
decline has ceased since 1998, at least among the traditional population of workplaces 
with 25 or more employees (Table 1).7  The decline in a couple of percentage points is 
not statistically significant.  This may reflect the importance of the political and policy 
climate under New Labour (Kersley et al., 2006; Bryson, 2006a).8  There is also a 
surprise in Table 1, namely the rise in union recognition rates in the shrinking private 
manufacturing sector. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
This slow down in the rate of decline in collective IR, confirmed in other research 
pointing to an increase in the rate of new union recognitions (Gall, 2004; Blanden et al., 
2006), is also apparent in the slower rate at which collective bargaining coverage has 
fallen since 1998, but again there are large sectoral differences with the rate of decline 
greatest in private manufacturing (Kersley et al., 2006: 187-188). 
One could nevertheless argue that, by the turn of the Century, the strongest forms of 
unionization had all but disappeared in Britain, at least in the private sector.  One-in-five 
private manufacturing workplaces recognizing unions for bargaining scored a maximum 
of three points on Millward et al.’s (2000: 179-183) index of union strength by 1998, as 
did one-in-seven private service workplaces recognizing unions.9  The closed shop had 
effectively been outlawed in Britain by 1990 so it was not surprising to see that it had 
virtually disappeared by 1998 (Millward et al., 2000: 147).  Only 3 per cent of 
workplaces with 5 or more employees had 100 per cent union membership in WERS04.  
Among workplaces with union members who recognized unions and had 25 or more 
employees, the percentage with 100 per cent union membership fell from 19 per cent in 
1984 to 13 per cent in 1990 to 4 per cent in 1998 (Millward et al., 2000: 140).   By 2004 
the figure stood at 6 per cent. 
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 An employer may recognize a union for pay bargaining such that the union bargains over wages, even 
when there are no union members present on the site.  This phenomenon was only tracked in WERS for the 
first time in 2005, indicating that 3 per cent of all workplaces – or one-tenth of those recognizing unions – 
‘would not have been identified as recognizing unions in earlier surveys in the series’ (Kersley et al., 2006: 
120).   
8
 Union recognition did decline between 1998 and 2004 in workplaces with 10-24 employees (Kersley et 
al., 2006: 120). 
9
 Workplaces scored a point for each of the following: union density of 75% or more, an on-site lay union 
representative, and collective bargaining coverage of 80% or more. 
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It is one thing to ‘map’ the demise of collective industrial relations, quite another to seek 
to explain it.  Surveys of individual employees were able to take analysts so far.  For 
example, they were useful in identifying the role played by compositional change in the 
workforce.  Studies such as Bryson and Gomez (2002) showed that compositional change 
in the workforce accounted for only a minority of the decline in union membership.  They 
also showed that the stock of members had declined due to a rise in the percentage of 
employees who had never joined a union, as opposed to an increase in the rate of exit 
from membership (Bryson and Gomez, 2005).  By 2005 never-membership accounted for 
just over half of employees in employment (Bryson, 2006a).  However, WIRS allowed 
for unique in-sights for two reasons.  First, it was able to track change in collective IR 
alongside managerial attitudes to unionization.  Second, it combined cross-sectional and 
panel workplace data allowing analysts to identify the extent to which union decline was 
due to changes in the composition of workplaces, on the one hand, and behavioural 
change among surviving workplaces on the other.   
The decline in the incidence of collective IR across the economy was due, in large part, to 
a cohort effect, rather than behavioural change among surviving workplaces.  Newer 
workplaces had a lower propensity to unionize than older ones, with evidence pointing to 
a ‘golden age for union recognition…..during the Second World War and the years 
immediately following it’ (Millward et al., 2000: 103).10  Instead, newer workplaces have 
adopted non-union forms of voice, usually direct two-way forms of communication 
(Willman et al., 2006a).  Union workplaces, on the other hand, have largely eschewed 
full union de-recognition but have increasingly supplemented union voice with non-union 
voice (op. cit.).  Across the economy as a whole, the percentage of ‘no voice’ workplaces 
has remained constant since the mid-1980s at around one-sixth (Bryson et al., 2004; 
Willman et al., 2006b), casting doubt on concerns about the growth in ‘bleak house’ IR.  
Between 1998 and 2004 patterns of change shifted.  The union recognition rate among 
panel workplaces with 10 or more employees who were in existence throughout the 
period was stable.  Recognition was also more or less stable among workplaces with 25 
or more employees in the 1998 and 2004 cross-sectional data.  However, union 
recognition fell quite dramatically among the smallest workplaces with 10-24 employees.  
Nevertheless new workplaces remained steadfastly non-union - their union recognition 
rates were far lower than older workplaces and those that had closed over the period 
(Kersley et al., 2006: 120-121). 
WIRS also cast light on what happened within the union sector.  By assessing the decline 
in union density across workplaces with different levels of managerial support, Millward 
et al. (2000: 150-2) were able to show that “the decline in the closed shop and strong 
management endorsement of membership were the main reasons for the fall in mean 
union density in unionized workplaces between 1984 and 1990.” However, the picture 
was “quite different” for the period 1990 to 1998 when “employees appeared to have lost 
their appetite for unionism.” In essence, in the 1980s unions lost the support of 
government and managers, whereas in the 1990s “they also lost the support of many 
employees.”  Managers’ attitudes towards unions remained unchanged over the period 
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 Machin (2000) reports similar findings also using WERS data. 
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1998-2004 (Kersley et al., 2006: 114-115) but there are signs that the rapid growth in 
free-riding in the 1980s has ceased (Bryson, 2006a). 
3.  From Unions To HRM? 
Whereas collective IR remained strong in the public sector, analyses of WIRS 1984-1998 
indicated that changes in the types of workplace entering and leaving the population 
played only a minor role in the demise of collective IR in the private sector (Bryson et al., 
2004).  Rather, the decline was widespread, a cohort effect affecting most types of 
workplace, with newer workplaces entering the population increasingly likely to be non-
union relative to their older counterparts, regardless of their other characteristics 
(Millward et al., 2000; Millward, 1994).  This raised the question: what would take its 
place?  Or, as Millward et al. (2000: 234) had put it, there had been ‘a transformation – 
but to what?’  Responding to the findings in WIRS90, commentators envisaged one of 
two scenarios: a growth in HRM – something which had been discussed for some time in 
the USA – or the return of managerial prerogative in which employees were talked at 
rather than listened to, something Sisson (1993) described as ‘bleak house’ IR (Sisson, 
1993) and Guest called ‘black hole’ IR (Guest, 1995: 125-127). 
WIRS analysts had little to go on in mapping this change because the survey’s core 
questions contained relatively little by way of HRM indicators.  This was partly because, 
up until that point, WIRS had primarily focused on those collective IR institutions which 
had been central to policy debate since Donovan, and partly because it is inherently 
difficult to foresee trends in and construct survey measures to capture them in advance.  
As Marginson (1998: 376) put it: 
‘In mapping change and continuity of industrial relations practice, WIRS has been more 
adept at charting the decline of the Donovan model than at teasing out the essential 
characteristics of (different forms of) industrial relations in the absence of trade unionism 
and collective bargaining….Almost inevitably, surveys are better equipped to indicate the 
direction(s) in which industrial relations practice is heading from than where it is heading 
to.’ 
Nevertheless, accepting this limitation, it appeared from the primary analysis of WIRS90 
that ‘union free’ IR was characterized by a procedural informality in which employees 
had little opportunity to contribute or influence workplace developments or air 
grievances, and in which ‘managers generally felt unconstrained in the way they 
organized work’ (Millward et al., 1992: 364).  What surprised commentators at the time 
was that the ‘fragments of HRM’ that were discernible appeared to co-exist with trade 
unionism, rather than substituting for them (Sisson, 1993: 206).  For  Sisson (op.cit.) this 
was one of ‘the most striking findings of WIRS3’.11   Yet it is a finding that has persisted 
                                                 
11According to Marginson and Wood (2000: 493) Sisson’s (1993) paper was the first WIRS article to use 
the term ‘human resource management’.  The term appears three times in the WIRS90 sourcebook index 
but runs throughout Millward’s (1994) secondary analysis of WIRS90 and is one of the focal points of the 
book. 
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over the WIRS series (Machin and Wood, 2005).  One reason for this initially surprising 
finding is that the positive effects of HRM on labour productivity appear to be confined 
to the unionized sector, at least according to secondary analyses of WERS98 (Bryson et 
al., 2005a). 
Conceptions of HRM appearing in these early empirical investigations of the 
phenomenon where necessarily limited by the items collected in the WIRS surveys.  For 
Millward (1994) they included financial participation schemes, harmonization of terms 
and conditions, ‘high trust’ practices such as the absence of close monitoring of work 
start and finish times, and a plethora of managerial methods for communicating with 
employees.  Machin and Wood (2005) were constrained by the data available for the 
whole WIRS series from 1980 to 1998 with their HRM practices including variable pay 
systems, joint consultative committees, problem-solving groups, team briefings, regular 
meetings between employees and senior management, use of the management chain, 
suggestion schemes and the presence of personnel specialists.  Recognizing the 
limitations of these data, the survey instruments were radically overhauled in 1998 
(Cully, 1998).  As Marginson and Wood (2000: 491) note, these new questions ‘aimed at 
capturing emergent aspects of employment relations practice including task flexibility 
and team-working; performance appraisal systems; individualization of the employment 
contract; equal opportunities practice; family-friendly working arrangements; 
performance monitoring; and total quality management’.  These effectively ‘opened up a 
number of avenues including fuller analysis of practices associated with human resource 
management, high-commitment management and partnership arrangements’ (op. cit., 
492). 
Subsequent analyses of HRM incidence suggested a pattern of systematic take-up of 
HRM among some workplaces but far from ubiquitous adoption across workplaces in 
Britain (Godard, 2001, 2004) leading one commentator to suggest that HRM may be 
difficult and costly both to establish and sustain, and may not actually deliver the 
widespread economic benefits that are often proposed (Godard, 2001: 28).  Using 
WERS98 Bryson et al. (2005b) were able to show that the uneven diffusion of HRM can 
be explained, to a large degree, by factors that are often associated with the uneven 
diffusion of technological innovations across firms. 
When WERS04 was published, analysts, commentators and policy-makers discovered 
they might have to wait even longer for the arrival of HRM.  The analysis in the primary 
sourcebook ‘pointed to a degree of stability in the incidence of practices that are often 
cited as indicators of sophisticated human resource management’ (Kersley et al., 2006: 
107).  The absence of a marked increase in team-working, multi-skilling and problem-
solving groups was cited as evidence ‘that the diffusion of so-called “high involvement 
management” practices has been rather muted in recent years’ (op. cit.).  Although there 
was a four-fold increase in the percentage of WERS respondents designating themselves 
‘HR’ managers over the period 1998-2004, the amount of time employment relations 
specialists spent on employment relations matters had fallen over the period and there 
was little change in the mix of tasks they performed (Kersley et al., 2006: 37-54).  
Furthermore, in spite of the centrality of ‘strategy’ in HRM thinking, there was no sign 
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that personnel management had become more strategic since 1998 (Kersley et al., 2006: 
61-70). 
4. Pay determination and the union wage premium 
I have already alluded to the fact that the decline in collective IR substantially diminished 
the role of collective bargaining in setting pay for employees in Britain due to the 
declining reach of trade unions and even where unions were present.  Among the 
traditional WIRS population of workplaces with 25 or more employees, the incidence of 
collective bargaining remained roughly constant between 1998 and 2004 in the economy 
as a whole, with around four-in-ten workplaces using collective bargaining (Kersley et 
al., 2006: 186).  The rate of decline in aggregate collective bargaining coverage in the 
economy as a whole has slowed since 1998 compared to the 1980s and 1990s but this 
hides big differences in sectoral trends.  The percentage of employees in private 
manufacturing covered by collective bargaining fell at twice the rate in 1998-2004 
compared to 1990-98 and was identical to the rate of decline for the 1984-90 period.  In 
private services, on the other hand, the rate of decline has slowed, albeit from a lower 
base.  Collective bargaining coverage in the public sector has actually risen since 1998 
(Kersley et al., 2006: 187-188). 
The traditional WIRS population of workplaces with 25 or more employees overstates the 
prevalence of collective bargaining in the economy.  Only one-in-eight private sector 
workplaces with 5 or more employees had any collective bargaining in 2004.  These 
workplaces were predominantly the larger workplaces so that one-quarter of employees 
were located in these workplaces (Forth et al., 2006: 57-59).  Nearly three-quarters (73 
percent) of employees in private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees had their 
pay set unilaterally by management – usually at workplace level (op. cit.).   Only a 
handful (5 percent) negotiated their pay individually with management. 
This diminution in collective bargaining coverage has had a profound effect on pay 
outcomes. A priori it is unclear what the net effect of unions might be on the pay 
distribution.12 In fact, declining unionisation has contributed substantially to rising wage 
inequality among men but not among women (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2003).  WIRS 
contributes to this debate by estimating union effects at workplace-level.  Where 
collective bargaining occurred in 2004 it continued to have a substantial impact in 
compressing pay at workplace level (Kersley et al., 2004:198) and in reducing the 
incidence of low pay (Kersley et al., 2004:199-200).13  Collective bargaining was also 
able to deliver a fringe benefits premium (op.cit.), as was the case in WERS98 (Forth and 
Millward, 2002a). In addition to these studies estimating the direct effects of collective 
                                                 
12
 Their pursuit of ‘standard’ rates for jobs is a force for pay equalization, as is the threat of unionization 
which forces non-union employers to raise pay or benefits to keep unions out.  On the other hand, they 
bargain for higher rates for their members relative to non-members.  Thus their impact on the wage 
distribution will depend, in large part, on how many workers they organize, which workers they organize, 
and variation in the wage premium across workers. 
13
 This ‘sword of justice’ effect of union pay bargaining has been verified using other data sources such as 
the Labour Force Survey and has been  estimated to have a much bigger impact on the gender pay gap than 
the introduction of the national minimum wage (Metcalf, 2005). 
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bargaining, Belfield and Heywood (2001) used WERS98 to estimate indirect effects of 
unions on dispersion in the non-union sector due to unionization ‘threat effects’.  They 
found the estimated probability of unionization had a negative but statistically non-
significant effect on workplace-level wage dispersion in the non-union sector. 
One of WIRS’s biggest contributions to our understanding of IR has been in the 
estimation of the union wage premium.  Early WIRS studies marked a big advance on 
previous studies. First, ceteris paribus estimates of the union wage premium could be 
made more accurately through comparisons of union and non-union workplaces, rather 
than the aggregate-level analyses that had preceded it. In particular, earlier inter-industry 
studies had overestimated the size of the union wage premium due to difficulties 
controlling for inter-industry differences in workplace characteristics (Blanchflower, 
1984; Stewart, 1987).  Second, WIRS offered a range of unionisation measures which 
meant that analysts could test the sensitivity of their results to different institutional facets 
of workplace arrangements.  This was particularly valuable since some WIRS variables – 
notably the closed shop and union density – were thought to be good proxies for the 
degree to which unions could monopolise the supply of labour to employers, this 
monopolisation being the source of their bargaining power.  
Blanchflower’s (1984) paper analyzing the union wage premium among manual workers 
with WIRS80 was seminal.  It was the first to use workplace-level data in Britain14 and, 
in covering semi-skilled and skilled manual workers in manufacturing, non-
manufacturing and the whole economy, it was far more comprehensive than any previous 
analysis for Britain. He cites thirteen previous studies for the Britain, four of which use 
union membership as a measure of unionization, with the remainder using coverage by 
collective bargaining agreement. Blanchflower argues that estimates based on WIRS80 
are less likely to be biased than previous estimates for two reasons.  First, he uses 
workplace-level union recognition which, he maintains, is less prone to measurement 
error in a survey of personnel managers (Blanchflower, 1984: 322).15  Second, he uses 
micro-data as opposed to the aggregate data used in all but one of the previous studies 
permitting the inclusion of a richer array of control variables and the avoidance of 
aggregation bias emanating from variation in union differentials across industries.16 His 
estimates of the union wage premium are lower than those using aggregate data and are 
larger for semi-skilled manual workers than for skilled manual workers.  The paper also 
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 Blanchflower (1984: 328) cites some earlier studies using establishment micro-data in the USA. 
15
 The reason why so much of the existing literature uses union membership, rather than bargaining 
coverage, to estimate union effects, is that coverage measures are usually absent or assumed to be measured 
with error.  Surveys of individual employees such as BSA do obtain measures of union recognition but 
these are likely to be more error-prone than individuals’ reports of their own membership and of managers’ 
reports of union recognition.  This is indicated by the percentage of employees responding ‘don’t know’ to 
the recognition question in BSA and the percentage who equivocate when asked whether they are sure of 
their answer.  Conversely, however, personnel managers’ estimates of the union membership status of their 
employees is likely to be less accurate than employees’ own accounts.  Evidence indicates that WERS 
managers tend to underestimate union density (Kersley et al., 2006: 111).  
16
 The upward biases in union wage premium estimates associated with aggregate data relative to micro-
data were well-known from H. Gregg Lewis’s (1983) studies for the USA and were also apparent from the 
much lower estimate Stewart (1983) achieved with his analysis of the 1975 National Training Survey when 
compared with other UK studies which had used aggregate data.   
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identifies a higher premium in the non-manufacturing sector which had not been studied 
up to that point.  The operation of union variables was also found to differ across sectors, 
with workplace-level union recognition and multi-unionism associated with higher wages 
in non-manufacturing whereas in manufacturing it was industry-level unionization that 
mattered. 
WIRS studies have consistently demonstrated that the size of the union premium is 
correlated with the ability of unions to monopolise the supply of labour and that, where 
unions are weaker there is often no premium at all.  For instance, Stewart (1987) found 
the workplace-level union recognition premium for skilled manual workers in WIRS80 
was confined to those working in establishments with a closed shop.  In a subsequent 
paper, Stewart (1995) attributes part of the decline in the union wage premium in Britain 
to the demise of the closed shop over the period.17   
Multi-unionism was a big deal back in WIRS80 since 44 percent of workplaces 
recognising unions had more than one.  Theoretically, it isn’t clear a priori whether 
multiple unionism per se is a proxy for union bargaining strength.  As Blanchflower 
noted (1984: 320): ‘On the one hand a pluralism of unions may strengthen the power of 
management who are able to play one union off against another.  On the other hand, 
however, a plurality of unions may reinforce their overall bargaining power’.  The latter 
appears particularly likely where multiple unions bargain jointly.  Using WIRS84 Machin 
et al. (1993) found a union wage mark up associated with separate bargaining rather than 
multiple unionism per se, a finding consistent with Horn and Wolinsky’s (1998) 
proposition that when a union represents only a section of the workforce it tends to ignore 
its bargaining externalities on other employees such as possible job loss associated with 
higher wages, and this is accentuated if unions bargain separately rather than jointly.  
Since then multi-unionism has declined (Millward et al., 2000) and those pockets that do 
exist may be workplaces where unionisation was particularly strong.   Perhaps not 
surprisingly, then, analyses using WERS98 (Forth and Millward, 2002b; Booth and 
Bryan, 2004) found a wage premium associated with multiple unionism, though in Booth 
and Bryan’s case it was confined to manual workers.  
A recent preoccupation of analysts has been whether or not there is a union wage 
premium at all in Britain.  This seems implausible, not least because one would expect 
workers to obtain some tangible benefit from membership to induce them to join.  
However, there is some evidence of a decline in the premium. Using WERS98 Forth and 
Millward (2002b) found that the union premium was confined to employees in 
workplaces with high bargaining coverage or multiple unions.  The absence of a general 
union premium is confirmed in analyses using other data sets such as British Social 
Attitudes:  Bryson (2006a) finds a premium of 5-7 percent in 1998 disappears by 2005 
when running analyses that are identical in specification.  Nevertheless, it is unclear from 
these studies whether this is a cyclical or secular phenomenon (Blanchflower and Bryson, 
                                                 
17
 The other reason Stewart cites for the decline in the union wage premium was unions’ inability to 
establish differentials in new workplaces. 
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2003).18  What’s more it is easy to overstate the degree of consistency in estimates of the 
wage premium using the early WIRS data.  Indeed, it is striking just how much variance 
there was in the union wage premium estimated using WIRS80 and WIRS84 
(Blanchflower, 1986: 200; 1990).  One pattern that emerged was that skilled workers 
were able to secure a wage mark-up irrespective of union status but less skilled workers 
were reliant on unions to secure it. 
Since 1998 WERS has incorporated linked employee data, as noted earlier, which 
includes banded weekly earnings and continuous hours data permitting analyses of both 
workplace-level and individual-level union wage premia.  These linked data also allow 
analysts to distinguish more clearly between the effects of union membership, bargaining 
coverage, and background individual and workplace characteristics.  This is important 
since the premium is essentially a product of bargaining rather than membership. 
Membership provides the bedrock to give unions just cause to bargain, and it provides a 
source of power. But in Britain there is no necessary reason to expect that a wage 
premium will be attached to membership, other than the fact that recognition and 
membership are positively correlated. This point is often overlooked by those relying on 
household and individual surveys that often rely on membership as the indicator of 
unionisation simply because they lack true measures of bargaining activity.  The dangers 
in doing so are illustrated by Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) whose analyses of 
WERS98 showed that estimates of the union membership wage premium based on 
employee-only data were upwardly biased because some of the positive wage effect 
attributed to membership was actually due to members being employed at better-paying 
workplaces.   
One of the puzzles in the existing union wage premium literature is the apparent union 
membership wage premium even among workers covered by collective bargaining (eg. 
Hildreth, 2000).  The linked employer-employee data in WERS98 provided an 
opportunity to test whether this apparent premium was, in fact, due to unobserved 
differences between the workplaces employing members and non-members.  Using 
linked employer-employee data from WERS98 Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) and 
Bryson (2006b) show that the union membership premium falls dramatically among 
covered workers having controlled for observable workplace heterogeneity.  Using a 
slightly different subset of the WERS98 data and controlling for unobservable 
workplace-level influences on wages by exploiting the within-workplace variation in 
wages Booth and Bryan (2004) find no significant union membership wage premium 
among covered workers, suggesting that the ‘puzzle’ has been solved, together with the 
seeming paradox of free-riders refusing to avail themselves of this benefit. 
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 Another reason for exercising caution when drawing inferences about trends in the union wage premium 
is that estimation techniques used in earlier papers tend to generate higher estimates than the 
techniques currently in vogue. So, for instance, Forth and Millward (2002c) show Stewart’s unweighted 
estimates are lowered once one accounts for survey characteristics. In the case of Booth and Bryan (2004) 
and Bryson (2006b) the non-significant membership premium result is due to the use of IV and PSM 
estimation, respectively. OLS estimates presented in those papers are significant and much 
higher.  The latest estimates from the Labour Force Survey for 2004 and 2005 indicate a union membership 
wage premium of 12 percent (controls are age, its square, male, 6 schooling dummies, 4 race dummies, 22 
region of work dummies and 11 industry dummies.  I thank Danny Blanchflower for these LFS estimates. 
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Multiple observations of employees within the same workplace also permit analyses of 
spillover effects of collective bargaining and union membership on uncovered workers 
and non-members.  These effects prove to be fairly important.  Using WERS98 Forth and 
Millward (2002b) found no general mark-up for employees covered by collective 
bargaining.  However, there was evidence of a spillover effect from covered to uncovered 
workers in unionised establishments which suggests the presence of a small workplace-
level wage premium of around 4% associated with the presence of recognised unions. 
Larger premiums of around 10%, however, were confined to workers in workplaces with 
high bargaining coverage or multiple unions. Using WERS98 Belfield and Heywood 
(2001) also found the threat of unionisation was associated with higher wages for 
employees in the non-union sector.19 
In another WERS98 paper Bryson, Forth and Kirby (2005a) find a union wage premium 
which is confined to what they define as ‘high involvement management’ (HIM) 
workplaces.  Although these HIM practices are associated with higher labour productivity 
as well they do not affect the financial performance of union workplaces.  These findings 
are consistent with concession wage bargaining (as opposed to ‘mutual gains’) or simply 
the hiking of wages in recognition of employees’ increased labour productivity in the 
presence of HIM work practices.  A further possibility suggested by Forth and Millward’s 
(2004) WERS98 analysis identifying a wage premium associated with HIM workplaces 
is that unionization and HIM may be jointly determined, perhaps indicating that HIM 
workplaces tend to be high-wage workplaces where employers will value worker voice 
such as that offered by unions. 
Finally in this section on unions and wages, it is worth recalling that, as well as furthering 
our understanding of pay levels, there is a strong WIRS tradition identifying factors 
associated with the size of pay settlements.  WIRS is a useful source of information on 
this issue given its representative nature and the general lack of information on pay 
settlements in the economy more generally.  However, its impact in policy discussions is 
limited given the gap between data collection and data analysis, such that policy analysts 
often resort to other data.20  
The actual list of influences on pay settlements contained in WIRS would have been 
anathema to most economists at the time since manager’s responses indicated that, quite 
unlike in the neoclassical economist’s world, employers can be price-makers when it 
comes to setting wages, not just the ‘takers’ of prices for labour set by laws of supply and 
demand to which they are passive respondents.  This is a standard observation for IR 
academics, but was far more controversial for labour economists grappling with early 
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 This effect did not reduce wage dispersion within non-union workplaces however, since the effect was no 
more pronounced for lower-paid than higher-paid employees. 
20
 The best known source is perhaps the CBI’s Pay Databank.  For examples of analyses using these data 
see, for example, Brown et al. (2004). However, these data are confined to CBI members and have 
traditionally focused on manufacturing settlements.  The Databank was suspended in 2003 and is unlikely 
to resume.  Other valuable sources include databases maintained by Incomes Data Services, Industrial 
Relations Services and the Labour Research Department. For more details see 
http://www.cipd.co.uk/subjects/pay/general/paysettle.htm. 
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WIRS data, a point nicely illustrated by Blanchflower and Oswald (1988a) in their 
seminal paper on the role of firm-specific factors in pay determination.  
Using WIRS84 Millward and Stevens (1986: 246-7) found that ‘in general terms, the 
influences upon the pay settlements that were jointly regulated were not very different 
from those that were unilaterally determined by managers…the considerations taken into 
account in determining the pay of unionised workers applied also to unorganised 
workers.  The difference lay not in the considerations, but in who considered them and 
how the decision was taken as to what weight should be attached to each’.  There was one 
exception: merit and performance pay tended to be cited more often in non-union 
settings. 21  
Blanchflower and Oswald’s papers (1998a, 1990) developed the sourcebook analyses and 
supplemented them with multivariate analyses.  They came to the same conclusion 
regarding influences over pay settlements in the union and non-union sectors, namely that 
‘with the interesting exception of merit payments for individual performance, union and 
non-union pressures upon wage settlements are apparently similar’ (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1988a: 367-268). Perhaps more importantly, however, Blanchflower and 
Oswald’s (1988a; 1990) papers and Blanchflower et al.’s (1990) paper raised severe 
doubts about the general applicability of the competitive model of pay determination by 
showing the importance of factors internal to the workplace in determining wage 
settlements and wage levels. Concluding their 1990 paper which identified the 
importance of factors such as workplace financial performance in determining the weekly 
earnings of ‘typical’ workers in WIRS84, the authors say (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1990: 159: 
“the broad conclusion from this paper is that the classical competitive model of the labour 
market does not provide an adequate explanation of wage determination in the United 
Kingdom. Instead, pay levels are shaped by an intricate blend of internal and external 
forces. For all but the unskilled non-union sector, a model based on the distinction 
between insiders and outsiders, where unions and bargaining play a central role, may 
offer the most appropriate framework. Even parts of the non-unionized sector of the 
economy exhibit signs of insider influence.”22 
Similar open-ended questions about influences on pay settlements were asked in 
WIRS90.  WIRS84 had been conducted ‘when the rate of inflation had fallen to a low 
level (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 246) whereas WIRS90 ‘was increasing – from around 
7 percent to nearly 10 percent after several years at around 5 percent’ (Millward et al., 
1992: 239).  Yet in both surveys the cost of living was the most frequently cited 
consideration in pay settlements. 
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 In WIRS80 very different questions about pay increases were asked of unionized and non-unionized 
workplaces precluding such comparisons (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 195-197). 
22
 Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) went on to develop these ideas in their identification of the wage curve 
indicating a negative correlation between local wages and local unemployment, a relationship they first 
observed in WIRS80. 
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The WERS98 sourcebook devoted three and a half pages to pay determination (Cully et 
al., 1999: 106-109).  Little wonder, then, that it did not report on the new set of pay 
settlements questions contained in the revamped questionnaire.  The questions differed 
from those appearing in earlier surveys in two major respects.  First, in previous surveys 
data had been collected for manual and non-manual workers separately.  In WERS98, on 
the other hand, questions focused on the pay settlement for the core group of non-
managerial employees at the workplace (what WERS terms the ‘largest occupational 
group’).  However, because two-thirds of workplaces use identical arrangements for all 
occupational groups, analyses of pay settlements for core employees tend to be 
representative of workplaces as a whole (Millward et al., 2001).  Second, the term ‘pay 
settlements’ was beginning to feel outmoded.  As Forth and Millward (2002d: 3) note, 
‘pay settlements’ was the ‘pervasive but out-moded terminology of collective bargaining’ 
for the process of periodic adjustment to pay levels.  Thus the questionnaire referred to 
‘pay settlement or review’ and ‘pay settlement or award’.  Millward et al.’s (2001) and 
Forth and Millward’s (2002d) analyses of private sector pay setting using these richer 
data in WERS98 revealed a number of interesting features of the pay process.  Inflation 
continued to play a key role in pay adjustments: 
“despite inflation being at historically low levels, employers still review and adjust pay 
levels overwhelmingly on an annual basis. Settlements are clustered around the 
prevailing rate of inflation…. Employers very commonly cite the inflation rate as a major 
influence upon the size of settlements, but they also commonly say that settlements are 
the same for their employees as for others in the same industry. It is difficult to 
disentangle these two influences. However, we produce some empirical evidence that 
both are at work: private sector settlements were probably higher when background 
inflation was higher; and there is some evidence of employers following a ‘going rate’ (of 
increase) in their industry.” (Forth and Millward, 2002d: 25). 
Turning to the role of trade unions, as noted earlier, unions frequently had little or no 
involvement in pay settlements even when, ostensibly, they were subject to collective 
bargaining. Pay was reviewed more frequently where unions were present than in cases 
where management were free to choose the frequency of settlements. However, 
collectively bargained pay settlements were similar in size to settlements achieved in the 
absence of unions.  This finding, in conjunction with the absence of an overall union 
wage premium in WERS98 (Forth and Millward, 2002b), suggests weakness in union 
bargaining power. 
The analysis of pay settlements in the WERS04 sourcebooks was confined to an analysis 
by size of firm (Forth et al., 2006: 60).  Our analyses identify a number of features of pay 
settlements that differ from the understanding obtained from earlier WIRS analyses. First, 
although pay settlements in the private sector are more likely to be reviewed on an annual 
basis where unions are involved compared to situations in which recognised unions are 
absent (96 percent against 87 percent), those in the non-union sector were also likely to 
occur more frequently than once a year (9 percent did so compared to 2 percent in the 
union sector).  Second, when asked how the most recent pay settlement for core 
employees compared to average increases for the industry for such employees, managers 
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of non-union workplaces were much more likely to say ‘Don’t know’ (18 percent against 
5 percent in the union sector).  Managers in non-union workplaces were also more likely 
to think the settlement was higher than the industry average (23 percent against 15 
percent) whereas managers of unionised workplaces were more likely to think the 
settlement was the same as the industry average (73 percent against 54 percent).  Perhaps 
the most interesting insights arise from an analysis of the factors influencing private 
sector pay settlements in the union and non-union sectors (Table 2).  Inflation was the 
dominant factor influencing the size of pay settlements in the union sector.  Whilst it was 
also mentioned by around half of managers in the non-union sector, the most common 
factor mentioned by non-union managers was the financial performance of the workplace 
or organization.  This ‘affordability’ factor was just as likely to be mentioned by 
managers in the union sector. This is quite a departure from earlier WIRS analyses.23   
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The table also shows that results differ somewhat if one extends the analysis to 
workplaces with 5 or more employees (the figures in parentheses in the table).  Using this 
wider base, the financial performance of the organization or workplace is the single most 
commonly cited factor influencing settlements in both the union and non-union sectors.  
Inflation continues to be more frequently cited in the union than the non-union sector, as 
are productivity levels.  The ability to recruit and retain staff features to a similar extent 
in both sectors.  Industrial action – either threatened or taken – was rarely a 
consideration. 
5.  Variable pay 
Variable pay has been a central issue in WIRS since the outset.  This is not surprising.  IR 
academics had been studying the role of piece-rates and payments-by-results in 
manufacturing for many years and their links with industrial unrest were a cause for 
concern to the Donovan Commission.  Today, variable pay is often viewed as the 
antithesis of the ‘standard’ or ‘common’ rate-for-the-job pay determination principle 
underpinning union wage setting (Marsden, 2004).  The idea, attractive to some, is that 
pay should match worker performance, not only because this might more fairly reflect 
employees’ just deserts, but also because the incentive effects of the link can bring their 
own benefits in terms of greater worker motivation and loyalty, higher effort and thus 
productivity and thus, ultimately, improved financial performance.   
As sourcebook analysts readily admit: 
“Systems of payment and reward are among the most complex phenomena that managers 
and researchers have to deal with.  The WIRS series has never attempted to capture their 
                                                 
23
 Although changes in question wording and format, and the splitting of analyses for manual and non-
manual employees makes comparisons with early WIRS difficult, it is clear from Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1988a: 366) and Millward and Stevens (1986: 246-247) that cost of living followed by 
productivity/profitability were the most commonly cited influences on pay settlements in the union and 
non-union sectors in 1984. 
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complexity and instead has settled for small groups of questions about specific payment 
practices” (Millward et al., 2000: 211-212). 
For this reason, WIRS’ primary contribution to understanding variable payment systems 
has been in mapping their incidence over time, their correlates and, as noted above, their 
links to performance outcomes.  The focus of the series has been on three types of 
system: payments by results (PBR), profit-related pay (PRP) and employee share 
ownership (ESOS).  Table 3 shows the incidence of PRP and ESOS.  In interpreting 
trends one must bear in mind changes in question wording and question formatting which 
mean that figures are not always wholly comparable (see the footnotes to the table for 
details).  However, some patterns are striking.  First, PRP schemes grew dramatically in 
the 1980s.  Speculation in the sourcebooks and early academic papers (eg. Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 1987) about the role of government tax incentives as a contributory factor 
was confirmed by panel analyses for the 1990s indicating tax incentives were an 
important reason for PRP adoption between 1990 and 1998 (Millward et al., 2000: 216).  
However, the percentage of trading sector workplaces with PRP schemes has been 
roughly static since then.  This is, however, only half the story.  Panel analyses for 1990-
98 and 1998-2004 have indicated substantial switching in and out of PRP (Millward et 
al., 2000: 215-216; Bryson and Freeman, 2006b).  ESOS also grew in the 1980s, 
continuing a trend that had begun in the 1970s (Millward et al., 2000: 216).  Again, tax 
treatment of the schemes may have played a role (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 210; 
Millward and Stevens, 1986: 259).  As in the case of PRP, ESOS incidence has remained 
fairly static since 1990 though, again, the panel data show a considerable amount of 
switching in and out of share-ownership schemes (Millward et al., 2000: 216; Bryson and 
Freeman, 2006b).  If one follows the WIRS sourcebooks in treating PRP and ESOS as 
schemes engendering financial participation by workers, then 57 percent of trading sector 
workplaces had such a scheme in 2004, a figure roughly comparable to that in 1990 (last 
row of Table 3). Yet some analysts continue to hold their breath in anticipation of an 
explosion in financial participation since this would seem to fit with trends towards 
greater reliance on employee initiative and the devolution of decision-making to teams 
and individuals. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
PBR has always been treated rather differently from PRP and ESOS in the WIRS 
sourcebooks.  PBR first appeared in Daniel and Millward (1983: 200) under the heading 
‘Systems of payment and control’.  It was reported on alongside methods for controlling 
time keeping and payments while sick and was treated as one of the ‘methods of 
bureaucratic control’ (op.cit.) targeted at manual workers, thus reflecting ‘strong class 
divisions’ (op.cit.) in British workplaces.  In the Donovan tradition, PBR was treated as 
part of the problem of shop floor bargaining and a cause of industrial strife (Daniel and 
Millward, 1983: 292). As Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986: 26) note, PBR has 
traditionally been included in analyses of strike propensities since, though the need for 
regular adjustments to pay, it increases opportunities for disagreement. 
Daniel and Millward (1983: 205) went on to argue: 
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“Traditionally the purpose of PBR systems of pay has been to encourage workers to 
increase effort and output….In practice….there has been a tendency for PBR to become 
more an instrument of management control designed to ensure consistency of output.”  
By WERS98, however, PBR was more common among non-manual than manual 
workers (Millward et al., 2000: 213) and was categorised as a form of incentive payment 
rather than as a method of control, an approach also adopted in the WERS04 sourcebook 
(Kersley et al., 2006: 190-191). 
It is harder to track the changing incidence of PBR than it is PRP and ESOS due to 
alterations in wording and format.24  However, PBR was clearly increasing in the 1970s 
pre-WIRS due to incomes policies (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 207-208).  Workplace-
level incidence of PBR is not available for 1980 and 1984.25  WIRS90 enquired about 
PBR – calculated on an individual, group or establishment or organization basis – and 
merit pay, the latter being related to the subjective assessment of performance by a 
supervisor or manager.  Millward et al. (1992: 260) report 52 percent of workplaces 
having at least one such scheme covering some employees.  A revamping of the 
questions in 1998 makes tracking changes in the incidence of PRP over the 1990s 
difficult but Millward et al.’s (2000: 213) comparisons of cross-sectional and panel data 
suggested little change, or a possible small reduction in incidence.26  WERS04 reverts to 
question wording similar to that used in WIRS90.  Using this measure, 53 percent of 
workplaces with 25 or more employees in the trading sector had either PBR or merit pay 
in 2004, compared to 52 percent in 1990.27  However, using identical PBR measures in 
the 1998-2004 panel, it is apparent that PBR rose among private sector workplaces with 
adopters vastly outnumbering those dropping their PBR schemes (Bryson and Freeman, 
2006b). Thus it appears that there has been a substantial increase in the use of PBR since 
1998 though, on measures that are only roughly comparable, there has been little change 
in PBR and merit pay incidence since 1990. 
Individual incentive payments, profit-related pay and share schemes have continued to 
interest IR academics and labour economists because they can affect productivity and 
performance, pay levels, pay settlements and wage variation within and across 
workplaces. In fact, most analyses have focused on the links between variable pay and 
performance.  Numerous WIRS studies testify to the complex links between such 
payments and performance (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988b using WIRS84 is one of 
the earliest studies; for an analysis using WERS04 and a review of this largely WIRS-
based literature see Bryson and Freeman, 2006b).  On balance, one might conclude that 
there are positive though modest productivity returns to variable pay systems, that any 
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 For details of these changes see Millward et al., 2000: 212-213 and footnotes 20, 21 and 22 and Kersley 
et al., 2006: 190-191 and footnotes 10 and 11. 
25
 The only mention of PBR (and indeed PRP) in the WIRS84 sourcebook is a reference to their presence in 
the data set in footnote 16 of the concluding chapter . 
26
 The 1990 incentive pay figures cited in Millward et al. (2000: 212-213) are very different from those 
cited by Millward et al. (1992: 260) for 1990, a matter that requires further investigation. 
27
 The measures are not directly comparable since WIRS90 asked 8 occupational groups whether they had 
such payments where the establishment had 5 or more employees in that occupational group WERS04 first 
asks if any employees at the establishment get PBR or merit pay. 
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benefits differ markedly by type of variable pay scheme, and that – as IR academics have 
pointed out on a number of occasions – the way in which schemes are implemented and 
the criteria used to measure and reward performance are critical, sometimes creating 
adverse effects that would have been avoided in the absence of the scheme. 
Far less attention has been devoted to the links between these variable pay methods and 
pay outcomes.  Though it is not the focus of their paper, in their analysis of WERS98 
Belfield and Heywood (2001) find incentive pay increases wage dispersion (coefficient 
of variation) at workplace level whereas PRP and ESOS are not significant. There is no 
recent WIRS research assessing the effect of variable payments on pay levels though 
early WIRS studies found PBR was associated with higher pay for manual workers.28 
6. Climate of employment relations 
As Marginson (1998: 378) notes ‘respondents are not only informants, they are also 
actors within the workplace…relating events and practices of which they are a part’.  
Given the ‘contested’ nature of IR reliance on a single role-holder, such as workplace HR 
managers, may lead to a partial or biased picture of the nature of IR in the workplace.  
With multiple respondents often asked similar or identical questions about their 
perceptions of IR, WIRS has been able to establish the degree of ‘dissonance’ between 
respondents within the same workplace and has helped to explain reasons for the 
differences.  This is nowhere more apparent than in the case of perceptions of the climate 
of employment relations in the workplace.   
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the IR climate was assessed in terms of the number and 
duration of strikes.  Relating how the PEP 1975/76 workplace survey was conducted 
Daniel (1976) cites the 3 day week as a reason for disruption to survey schedule.  The 
survey found that over half (57 percent) of manufacturing plants rating IR as “good” cited 
‘lack of strikes/disputes’ as a reason for their rating (1976: 9), by far the most heavily 
cited reason, confirming the centrality of industrial disputes in managers’ day-to-day 
thinking about IR. As Daniel notes (1976: 8): ‘managers tend to define good industrial 
relations as being the absence of any disruption to working and the lack of any challenge 
to their authority’.  This was the case in spite of the fact that, at the time of the survey 
strikes were at their lowest since 1968 (1976: 8-9). 
WIRS80 made a number of contributions to discussions about industrial conflict in 
Britain.  First, it gave a more accurate picture of the incidence of industrial action than 
other sources.  Just as the Warwick Workplace Survey had identified strikes of short 
duration and those in smaller workplaces were under-recorded (Brown, 1981:97-101) so 
WIRS80 provided information on the incidence of industrial action short of a strike 
where official statistics were either absent or patchy (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 291-3). 
Furthermore, as IR scholars might have anticipated, Daniel and Millward (1983) found 
managers and worker representatives in WIRS80 disagreed about the occurrence of 
industrial action, a finding replicated in subsequent surveys.  
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 Bryson and Freeman are currently investigating the effects of variable pay on wage levels in their study 
for the DTI. 
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Second, it supplemented information on the incidence of strike action with other 
information about conflict at work such as claims to industrial (employment) tribunals 
and perceptions of the ‘climate’ of IR at the workplace.  Management perceptions of 
‘climate’ indicate an improvement in IR since 1990 but, perhaps surprisingly, relations 
remain poorer than they were in the early 1980s (Table 4). The table also shows that, 
whereas managerial perceptions of climate were poorer in union workplaces than in non-
union workplaces in 1980-1990, the gap had disappeared by 1998.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to the single-item climate indicator available in WIRS since the outset, WIRS 
includes items such as sanctions against employees (formal written warnings, 
suspensions of employees, deductions from pay, internal transfers for disciplinary 
reasons), and days lost through sickness and absence.  These have proven particularly 
valuable in obtaining a comprehensive picture of employment relations and workplace 
conflict following the virtual disappearance of industrial action by 2004 (Kersley et al., 
2006: chapter 8). The single-item climate variable is correlated with these alternative 
measures in the way one would imagine (Kersley et al., 2006: 278-279).  Other measures 
of climate are available in the Survey of Employees and have been used by some analysts 
to construct multi-item composite indexes of climate in the absence of validated scales in 
WERS (Guest et al., 1999; Ramsay et al., 2000). 
Third, WIRS showed different actors had very different perceptions of the climate of IR 
at the workplace. Data for worker representatives matched to that of managers showed 
that reps have a poorer perception of the industrial relations climate than their managerial 
counterparts (Daniel and Millward, 1983: 254-256).  This finding has been replicated 
over the course of WIRS. The advent of linked employer-employee data in 1998 meant 
that analysts were able to assess managers’ perceptions of IR climate alongside those of 
employees in the same workplace.  Comparisons revealed that managers tended to view 
climate more positively than their employees in the population with 25 employees or 
more (Cully et al., 1999: 283) and the population with 10 or more employees (Bryson, 
2005).  Similar findings have been reported for 2004 (Kersley et al., 2006: 278).  What’s 
more, over the period 1998-2004, there has been an improvement in managers’ 
perceptions of climate that is not apparent among employees (Kersley et al., 2006: 277-
278). 
Fourth, WIRS permitted analysts to investigate workplace-level correlates of IR climate 
and industrial conflict.  Blanchflower and Cubbin’s (1986) paper using WIRS80 was the 
first to use micro data to assess propensities for various types of industrial action.  Their 
coverage of the non-manufacturing sector was also novel.  Their findings from 
multivariate analyses broadly confirmed results from the cross-tabular analyses 
undertaken by Daniel and Millward (1983). Using WERS98 Knight and Latreille (2000) 
looked at the correlates of individual conflict as measured by workplace variability in 
disciplinary action, dismissals and tribunal applications.  They showed that both 
workplace and workforce characteristics explained much of the variance.  Analyses of 
WERS98 and WERS04 have also shown that correlates of positive perceptions of climate 
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differed markedly across managerial respondents and employees within the same 
workplace (Bryson, 2005; Kersley et al., 2006: 279-286). 
7.  Unions and employment growth 
Finally I turn to the literature on the effect of unions on workplace-level employment in 
Britain to illustrate two things.  First, although changes in workplace employment have 
featured in the WIRS sourcebooks – notably when Millward and Stevens (1986: 11-13) 
reported a ‘preponderance of establishments with declining employment numbers’ over 
the recession period 1980-8429 – the analyses of this issue have largely occurred in 
academic papers.30  This literature is dominated by numbers from WIRS.  Second, it 
illustrates the way in which WIRS can help us understand IR not simply through the 
‘mapping’ of the terrain but by trying to understand the relationship between key 
variables in the data.  What is striking about this particular illustration is that this 
relationship between unionization and establishment employment change has remained 
roughly constant over the years. 
 
The WIRS literature on unions’ employment effects has focused on changes in workplace 
employment levels.  Early studies used retrospective data from managers on employment 
levels in earlier years to estimate union effects on employment change.  More recent 
studies have begun to use the WIRS panel data, thus obtaining more accurate 
information.  Studies tend to find that the average effect of union recognition is to lower 
employment growth by 2.5-4 per cent per annum relative to non-union workplaces, 
ceteris paribus (Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald, 1991; Machin and Wadhwani, 
1991; Booth and McCullogh, 1999; Bryson, 2004; Addison and Belfield, 2004).  Similar 
findings emerge from other countries (see Bryson, 2004 for a review).  This has led some 
analysts to refer to the employment effect of unions as the ‘one constant’ in studies of 
unions’ economic effects (Addison and Belfield, 2004).   
 
However, the evidence is not all one-way.  The effect is not apparent always and 
everywhere.  There is conflicting evidence on the union effect on employment growth in 
the late 1970s: Machin and Wadhwani (1991) identify a positive effect whereas 
Blanchflower et al. (1991) find a negative effect.  Also, in the first WIRS study on this 
issue Blanchflower and Millward (1988) found no significant union effects using 
WIRS80 and WIRS84.  Furthermore, some studies find union effects differ according to 
the nature of unionisation and the conditions facing the firm.  For instance, negative 
employment growth effects in the 1990s were more pronounced where bargaining 
coverage is high (Bryson, 2004) whereas the effect is ameliorated when unions bargain 
over employment and wages (2004: 494-495). Most of these studies focus on the private 
sector.  However, Addison and Belfield (2004) find negative employment growth effects 
of union recognition in the public sector similar to those for the private sector.  In 
addition, they find evidence for the public sector that changes in workplace-level union 
recognition affect employment growth, with new recognitions reducing employment 
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 Also see Millward et al., 2000:26-27. 
30
 WIRS sourcebooks have focused more on the ways in which workplaces make workforce reductions.  
For example, Millward et al., 1992: 320-326; Cully et al., 1999: 79-80 
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growth and union de-recognition increasing employment growth (Addison and Belfield, 
2004).  These union switches do not affect employment growth in the private sector. 
 
Interpreting these union effects is quite a different matter.  Some question whether the 
link is causal (Metcalf, 2005: 100).  It is only recently that WIRS analysts have shown 
that this union effect is not solely attributable to a slower rate of employment growth, but 
is also attributable, at least in part, to a greater propensity for unionized workplaces to 
undertake within-workplace job cuts (Bryson and White, 2006). 
 
It remains to be seen whether analyses of the WERS98-04 panel will reveal the same 3 
percent reduction in employment growth associated with unionization. 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks                                                                                                                                                 
This paper has sought to illustrate how WIRS marked a big departure in our 
understanding of IR in Britain.  In particular, the first two surveys, WIRS80 and 
WIRS84, when taken together, fostered  a new understanding of IR in Britain and how it 
was changing.  It was ‘new’ in the sense that the IR community had little else to go on 
that was nationally representative of all broad sectors of the economy.  It was also clear 
that the choice of the workplace as the visor through which we came to know IR was the 
appropriate level of analysis for many of the institutions and practices that were of 
greatest interest.  Simply establishing this way of conceiving IR was a considerable 
achievement.   
It is unsurprising, therefore, that these early surveys began to change the way we thought 
about IR in Britain.  Some seasoned observers go further.  Danny Blanchflower, an 
economist and IR specialist whose PhD was based on WIRS80 and who was among the 
first to crunch WIRS80 and WIRS84 mercilessly, argues that a large number of the first 
order questions about the nature of collective IR in Britain were answered in those 
surveys.  He also points out that, contrary to popular perception, these early studies 
painted a reasonably clear picture of the non-union sector in Britain.  Further, although he 
accepts that innovations such as the linked employer-employee data have been 
informative, he argues that diminishing returns set in after the first two surveys.31  Others 
may take a rather different view.  But perhaps one of the issues facing WIRS in 
subsequent years, identified by Millward (2001), is the difficulty surveys have in 
mapping the non-union sector which, by its nature, is less rule-bound than the union 
sector.  It has proven difficult to construct proxies for ‘slippery’ concepts that are key in 
non-union settings – and, indeed, to the HRM practices that are so common in the union 
sector.  Many of the survey items used to do so appear less than tractable in some 
analyses, which might partly explain the difficulties in replicating results across WIRS 
surveys.  
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 These points have been made in personal communications with the author. 
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Five surveys, 9 sourcebooks32 and many, many journal articles down the line33, we are 
used to seeing British IR through the lens of the workplace.  This is a remarkable 
achievement in many ways, as the foregoing discussion has illustrated, not least because 
an authoritative picture of IR and IR change is not available in most other countries 
around the world – including the USA.  The United States may have produced the most 
heavily cited IR book ever (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) but it did so without 
representative workplace-level data.  Indeed, in reviewing Kersley et al. (2006) Freeman 
described WIRS as ‘the gold standard survey of personnel and labour relations’ going on 
to say: 
“If only the US was smart enough to imitate this masterful survey and study!” 
The danger, of course, is that we come to rely too heavily on WIRS to answer our every 
IR question.  The dangers in over-reliance on WIRS are three-fold. First, as noted earlier, 
surveys can not do everything, no matter how good they are.  If surveys like WIRS crowd 
out case studies and other qualitative investigations of IR this will limit what we can 
come to know about IR.  Second, WIRS may collapse under its own weight if too much 
is placed upon its shoulders.  It is perhaps unreasonable to expect a single survey to tell 
us all we would like to know about workplace IR.   Third, it is perhaps because we are so 
accustomed to this workplace-level view of IR that we sometimes forget to ask whether 
the associations or relationships that we are exploring are best examined at the 
workplace-level or at some other level of aggregation.  This important question was 
posed by one of the WIRS founders not so long ago in relation to the evidence on the link 
between ‘high-involvement management’ and performance (Millward, 2001).  Millward 
suggested that, a priori, it was not clear whether such a relationship might obtain at global 
or multinational level, national enterprises, subsidiary companies, workplaces, product-
lines or at some other level of aggregation.  He pointed out that much depended upon the 
degree of variation in practices one observed within and across these organizational units.  
In a thinly veiled attack on empirical research to date on this issue he said:  
“I have seen no argued discussion for the choice of unit used in empirical studies of the 
HIM-performance relationship.  But I have seen prominent discussions of the subject 
mixing and confusing units at different levels as though it did not matter at what level the 
relationship was examined…Unless the theory driving the research is clear about the 
level at which the expected relationships are to be found, then the choice of statistical unit 
should be guided by some empirical information about the variation of the independent 
variable within the different levels of organizational units….Researchers who do 
secondary analysis are, of course, not faced with any choices to make about the unit of 
data collection.  It has been done for them.  But they should at least be aware that the 
survey data they have chosen to analyse may not have been gathered at the level that is 
universally appropriate for the phenomenon they are examining” (op. cit.: 4-5). 
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 In a personal communication John Forth estimated there are around 400-450 WIRS publications. 
Roughly 165 of these are articles in refereed journals and 15 are books. 
 27 
Of course, there are exceptions, such as the company level analysis of union recognition 
by Blanden et al. (2006), but they are rare.  It is clear that, if we are to deepen our 
knowledge of IR in Britain and the way it is changing we shall have to think more 
broadly than WIRS.   
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Table 1: Percentage of workplaces with 25+ employees recognizing unions, 1980 - 2004 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Manufacturing 65 56 44 28 37 
Private Services 41 44 36 23 20 
Public Sector 94 99 87 87 88 
All 64 66 53 42 39 
Sources: Millward et al., 2000; Willman and Bryson (2006) based on WERS. Note that 1998 
figures based on new weights explaining difference in 1998 private manufacturing figure 
compared with Millward et al. 2000. 
Table 2: Factors influencing size of most recent pay settlement for core 
employees in private sector, 2004 
Factors affecting most recent 
pay settlement for core 
employees: 
No union recognized Union recognized 
Changes in cost of living 55 (52) 75 (67) 
Ability to recruit/retain 
employees 
49 (45) 37 (45) 
Financial performance of 
organization or workplace 
68 (65) 66 (73) 
Productivity levels within 
organization or workplace 
46 (45) 42 (52) 
Industrial action threatened or 
taken 
<1 (<1) 4 (4) 
None of these 10 (11) 5 (5) 
Unweighted base 918 (1106) 489 (511) 
Notes: 
(1) Figures are column percentages.  Since codes are multiple response figures do not add to 
100. Figures are based on private sector workplaces with 10+ employees.  Those in parentheses 
are based on private sector workplaces with 5+ employees. 
(2) The definition of union recognition is confined to workplaces with union members on site to 
maintain comparability with the reported findings for WERS98. 
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Table 3: Incidence of profit-related pay and share-ownership schemes among trading 
sector workplaces with 25+ employees, 1980 - 2004 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Profit-related pay NA 19 44 46 44 
Share-ownership 
schemes 




NA 30 54 50 57 
Notes: 
(1)  Figures through to 1998 from Millward et al. 2000: 214-217.  Own calculations for 
2004. 
(2)  Trading sector includes the small number of publicly owned commercial companies, 
but their exclusion makes little difference to the figures. 
(3) Wording changes mean PRP and ESOS schemes may have been under-recorded in 
1998.  See Millward et al. 2000: 214-216 and footnote 24 and Kersley et al., 2006: 191-
193 
Table 4: Managerial perceptions of the IR climate among workplaces with 25+ 
employees, 1980 - 2004 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Panel A: Whole economy 
Very good 49 38 32 39 39 
Good 49 57 61 51 53 
Panel B: Unionized workplaces 
Very good 45 34 28 40 37 
Good 53 62 63 50 55 
Panel C: Non-unionized workplaces 
Very good 56 48 37 39 41 
Good 41 48 59 52 53 
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